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IN A PIG'S EYE: 
DAILY LIFE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE 
John W. Cole 
Introduction 
-----------
I would like to offer some thoughts about how to understand the condi-
tions of everyday life in the countries of southeastern Europe and about 
why this is worth doing. Since I am an anthropologist, it will not come as 
any surprise that I am enamored of research into small-scale social units: 
the stock in trade of anthropologists is to examine social, political and 
economic phenomena from the bottom up. One of my colleagues likes to call 
this the pig's eye view of the world: that is, the view that researchers 
get when they leave office or archieve and spend some time in the village 
mud. What I hope to illustrate is that this view can produce more than a 
collection of charming monographs about life in isolated villages and urban 
ghettos, or about the organization of particular factories or collective 
farms. The study of any country not informed by the pig's eye view is 
likely to be wide of the mark. This is not merely to say that it is a good 
idea to know what goes on in the village as well as in the politburo, 
although I do think that is true, too. Rather, it is to say that forces 
generated from below regularly influence what is happening at the top. If 
one would really understand what is going on in the capital, then one had 
best understand the kinds of interests in the provinces that leaders in the 
capital are responding to. 
I will say at the outset that I have reservations about much of main-
stream Western scholarship on Southeastern Europe. These reservations grow 
out of what I see as the frequent use of ill-conceived comparisons and 
ethnocentrism and gratuitous moralizing in place of analytic conclusions. 
There are alternative ways to intellectualize about Southeastern Europe, 
and these are beginning to provide interesting and useful alternatives to 
some of the conventional wisdom about the area. For example, I question 
the validity of comparisons between the conditions of life in Southeastern 
Europe and those in Western Europe or the United States. The past 
experiences of these areas are so different that comparison between them is 
spurious and often ethnocentric. More valid comparisons are to be made 
with other agrarian areas, even when these are located on other continents. 
About Corporate Structures and Aggregate Data 
The main focus of Western research about contemporary and modern South-
eastern Europe lies in studies of the actions of leaders and of the nature 
of the party and state organization, and in the compilation and analysis of 
aggregate economic, social and political data. This research is about how 
policies are made and implemented and about the effect of these policies on 
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the population at large. It also includes an evaluation or assessment of 
how things are going over there, mostly done by comparing policy goals with 
results and by comparing economic and social indicators with those in the 
countries of Western Europe and the United States. 
At the most abstract level, these studies view society as an outcome of 
policy. Lying behind this view, sometimes referred to as the "idealist" 
approach, is an assumption that these are centralized totalitarian states 
where all of the important decisions are made by a small clique of ruling 
communists who impose their will on the institutions and people of the 
country. In one of the two main variants of this approach, policies, and 
hence the characteristics of society, are derived from Marxist-Leninist 
thought. Such studies stress the contrasts between East and West, making 
invidious comparisons with the way in which society is determined in the 
decentralized, pluralistic Western democracies. 1 
The second variant deems ideology irrelevant and instead finds policy 
determined by both the nature of the country's techno-economic character 
and the imperatives of economic development. Differences between East and 
West are attributed to different degrees of development, which are in turn 
a consequence of variations in the extent of industrialization. These 
studies postulate a convergence in social and political forms, regardless 
of ideology, as the countries of Southeastern Europe "catch up with" the 
West in industrial capacity. 2 
In the main, the economy and society of Southeastern European countries 
are represented in Western literature by statistical trends. While some 
attention is paid to regional variation within particular countries, data 
are characteristically aggregated for whole countries. Central to analysis 
of such data is the establishment of trends based on a comparison of 
figures for a series of years. Correlations can then be made between 
different sectors of the economy, economic development and social or demo-
graphic trends correlated, the effects of policy in one realm or another 
assessed, and the direction of future trends predicted. 3 
We have learned a great deal about Southeastern Europe as a result of 
research of this type. What it fails to provide, however, is any sense of 
the social dynamics which produce the trends that it purports to describe. 
It does not take into account the many different social groupings and their 
social, political and economic characteristics. While national leaders are 
carefully studied, they are not the only individuals in the society who 
have goals to pursue, and the formal or corporate organizations of state 
and party are not the only framework within which individuals work toward 
their goals. The interests of all social segments obviously do not always 
correspond with those of the national leadership, and it is not safe to 
assume that one can ignore these segments as being of minor significance. 
The workings of Southeastern European societies result from the interplay 
of their different social segments, and not just from a population 
responding to the dictates of the leadership. 
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Unfortunately, data collected and published in national statistics, and 
analyses based on them, provide few clues about the nature or expressions 
of the interests of these social segments. One cannot discern whether an 
aggregate figure represents a series of data which are mutually reinfor-
cing, or whether it is an averaging of divergent trends. For example, if a 
statistic is pUblished which shows a national increase in the production of 
grain, has this resulted from small increases throughout the country, or 
has production gone up sUbstantially in some areas and down in others? If 
the birth rate rises, does this reflect a society-wide phenomenon, or is it 
a result of an increase among only cer tain social segments of the popula-
tion? There is no way to answer questions such as these on the basis of 
aggregate data alone, and projections based upon statistically determined 
trends using aggregate data are notoriously inaccurate. In ignoring the 
dynamics of society, such projections miss the growing power of trends 
masked for a time by temporar i1y prevalent, but waning, forces. 
If one is to know what a country is like, one 1Illst know the social 
processes behind the aggregate data. The problem, then, is to identifY the 
range of interests within each country and the nature of the social rela-
tions through which they are expressed. Access to the data from which 
pUblished statistics were der ived can sometimes provide useful clues, out 
one cannot count on it. After all, the census taker had his own priorities 
and conceptual framework, and it would De remarkable if they overlapped 
very much with those of the researcher. In the end there is only one 
solution to the problem of uncovering the dynamics of society: one must get 
out into the field and gather one's own data. 
A Few Pig's Eye Observations 
Several examples of the problems that can arise from aggregate 
analysis, and how these can be illuminated by research into small scale 
social units, illustrate this point. Marxist and positivist thought are in 
agreement that modernization results in the transformation of complex 
extended families into nuclear ones, in a reduction in family size, and in 
the general erosion of ties of kith and kin outside the family. The 
personalistic ties represented by these social relations are said to be 
characteristic of agrarian societies where the household is the unit of 
production and activities of more than one household scope are organized 
through alliances between households. With industrialization, the house-
hold is 00 longer the unit of production, and each nuclear family becomes 
self-sufficient through wages earned by its adult members. with urbaniza-
tion, related families become dispersed and, lacking compelling economic 
reasons to interrelate, ties between them are reduced to sporadic sociable 
occasions before withering away altogether. Such assistance as the family 
requires beyond its own means is to be found in the bureaucratic minister-
ings of the welfare state. Relations between members of individual 
households are now forged in the productive, political, educational and 
other ' institutions of modern society. With the transformation of peasants 
into agricultural workers, the process of nuclearization is expected to 
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penetrate the countryside as well. Any vestiges of extended families or of 
personalistic social networks between families are interpreted as an 
expression of traditional conservatism. Such phenomena are expected to 
disappear with the passage of time. 4 
The countries of Southeastern Europe in general, and Romania in 
particular, are all clearly undergoing industrialization and urbanization. 
In Romania the percentage of the population employed in urban occupations 
and the percentage of individuals living in cities have increased substan-
tially since the end of World War II. At the same time, the population has 
increased from under 16 million (1948) to over 21 million (1977). More-
over, over 90 percent of Romanian agriculture is carried out on either 
state or cooperative farms. Romania can therefore be expected to show the 
social trends that are presumed to accompany modernization1 and, indeed, 
national statistics and scholarly analysis based on them show the expected 
nuc1earization and reduced family size. As predicted, urban areas exhibit 
significantly lower percentages of extended families and smaller family 
sizes than do rural areas. However, both family size and the number of 
extended families are being reduced in the countryside as well. The few 
areas where private agriculture remains show the highest percentages of 
extended fami1ies. S 
In spite of this information, detailed research in Bra~ov County, one 
of the most industrialized in the country, and subsequent examination of 
statistical data from other parts of the country "from the bottom up," 
suggest that something rather different is going on. First, we found that 
a three-generation strategy dominates communities of worker villages in the 
hinterlands of industrial cities and that it is also strongly represented 
in the cities themselves. Second, we found that these extended family 
strategies were not merely a survival of a traditional social form among 
conservative ex-peasants, but that they are being constantly recreated out 
of the conditions of modern life in Romania. Third, the areas where the 
extended family is under the most threat are those which are most remote 
from urban centers. Our conclusion is that the apparent nuclearization 
trend in Romania is more an artifact of the nature of the census than of 
the realities of social life. 6 
The people who live in BraJov County have worked out a way to take 
advantage of a combination of rural location and proximity to cities in 
order to have the best of both urban and rural worlds. Their optimum 
strategy is to have at least one individual employed in town, while one 
works for the local cooperative farm and yet another remains at home to 
care for their own animals and private garden plots. This is most 
effective where there are at least three adult members of the household, 
and the extended family is an obvious way to do this. By deploying its 
workforce in this way a household is able to provide for subsistence needs 
from the agricultural products its members raise at home and receive from 
the cooperative farm as pay. Almost all of the money earned by the urban 
worker can then be devoted to consumer goods which improve the household's 
162 
standard of living. Clothing, home furnishings, seaside and foreign 
vacations, and even au toroooiles are high on their list of preferences. 
These household are usually made up of a married couple, their 
children, and one or more of their parents; more than one-half of the 
adults in these villages lived in such extended family households. 
However, we learned that this is not the only three""generation strategy. 
Although many of the younger generation take apartments in town and DOth 
husoand and wife work in the city, they nevertheless retain close ties with 
their parents oack in the village. Consumer goods purchased in the city 
constantly flow out to the parents in the village and agricultural produce 
flows to the children in the city. Visiting oack and forth between town 
and country is incessant, and in a small out Significant number of cases 
the children of uroan dwelling couples live in the village with their 
grandparents. The resulting level of economic and oocial interdependence 
is so great that it differs little from that of the three-<Jenerational 
household. 
While the roost intensive social and economic ties are roost often 
oetween parents and their offspring, there are aloo important links among 
village households and between them and the households of former villagers 
living in nearoy towns. Siolings, cousins, neighoors, ritual kin, class-
mates and other COmbinations of individuals cooperate in an endless variety 
of ritual, social and economic endeavor s. These range from attending 
weddings, where cash gifts enaole the newlyweds to o~ furnishings for 
their home, to helping a neighoor reouild a oarn, to finding a joo in a 
factory for a godoon. These are not just occasional peripheral phenomena, 
out rather a constant element of life; everyone is constantly involved in 
giving and receiving such support. 
Similar kinds of relations exist aroong families who have "always" oeen 
city residents. Within cities a variant of the three-<Jenerational strategy 
is well established. Retired grandparents are the roost reliable baoy-
sitters. They aloo have the time to keep active in networks over which 
flows information about where scarce and desiraOle consumer items can De 
found, and to stand in the queues which characterize everyday shopping and 
become especially long when word spreads that some scarce item has suddenly 
become availaole. In return for these efforts, older individuals can 
expect to share some of the comforts provided oy their offsprings' wages 
that they would not be aole to enjoy on a pensioner's income alone. In the 
cities, this cooperation is transformed into a three""genera tiona I house-
hold much less often than in rural areas or villages, in the main because 
of the small size of apartments, constructed with nuclear families in mind. 
No matter OOW close the cooperation, a desire to maximize the total amount 
of living space availaole to the group as a whole leads them to retain 
their separate households. 
The strength of these ties in uroanized counties is in rather marked 
contrast to social developments in counties which do not have urban 
centers. In these relOOte areas villagers do not have the option of working 
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in town while living in the village, and individuals have few vocations 
other than agriculture to choose from. If they wish to pursue some other 
career, they have little choice but to leave the village and move to a 
distant city. with higher pay and more cultural attractions to be found in 
the cities, that is exactly what most young people are doing. Since a 
three-generational strategy is much harder to work at a distance, young 
people who migrate more often live as nuclear family units. Moreover, as 
older couples are left behind to fend for themselves, migration also 
creates nuclear family households in rural areas. Thus, the process of 
nuclearization is actually more characteristic of remote areas of the 
country than it is of those close to town. While agriculture-based 
extended families continue to exist, their numbers are being reduced as a 
result of an uneven development that draws migrants away to other parts of 
the country. 
In summary, we found that both in cities and in villages in urbanized 
regions there is very intense domestic cooperation across generational 
lines, cooperation which in the villages is associated with three-
generational households. However, both in cities and in town-and-country 
combinations, the cooperation takes place between closely related couples 
who live in different households. In contrast, migration from villages in 
remote parts of the country tends to leave nuclear families behind in the 
village at the same time that it creates new ones in the city. The 
aggregate data for the country at large, based on a census of households, 
cannot include information on the quality of social relations between 
members of different households. It therefore misses those three-
generational strategies which are not based on residence, as well as the 
generally high level of ritual, social and economic interaction found in 
modern Romanian worker villages. Nor can it differentiate between the 
social processes going on in villages proximate to urban centers and those 
that are more distant from cities. As a result, it presents a false image 
of the realities of social relations in modern Romania. 
It would be a mistake to view these domestic relations as a temporary, 
transient phenomenon associated with an early stage in modernization. In 
fact, they are consistent with long-range Romanian economic and social 
planning. Instead of trying to build urban apartments for the entire 
industrial work force, the Romanians have developed an elaborate economic 
infrastructure connecting village to town and are depending on commuting 
labor. In Brasov County, 40 percent of the urban work force resides in the 
countryside. Moreover, through an aspect of planning called systematiza-
tion, the Romanians intend to strengthen this pattern and to increase the 
cultural and social services available to villagers so as to reduce 
discrepancies between rural and urban life styles. At the same time, 
another aspect of their planning, carried out under the rubric of multi-
lateral development, is to expand industrial development in the more remote 
areas of the country. To the extent that this is successful, it will 
reduce migration and increase the opportunities for villagers in remote 
areas to elect urban employment while living at home in the village. One 
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can reasonably expect that this will establish the same domestic patterns 
in these areas as row exist in Bra;;ov and other urban counties. 
Corpora te and Noocorpora te In ter re la t ions 
Three-generation domestic strategies and networks of social relations 
among people in town and country are no epiphenomena or mere curiosities. 
They are elements in a noocorporate social structure which pervades all 
aspects of R>manian li fe and influences the way in which poli tical, 
economic and social change is taking place. Indeed, even the operation of 
the R:>manian corporate world of party and state organization cannot be 
properly understood without refereoce to it.* Let me illustrate this by an 
exanple. 
A Romanian acquaintaoce was the director of a distr ibution center for 
bOttled gas used in cooking stoves. B:>ttled gas is available only through 
such centers and can only be obtained by turning in an enpty bottle and 
paying for the gas in the full bOttle. Since there was a slightly higher 
demand for gas than could be filled out of available inventory, a list was 
established. One's place on the list was determined by how long it had 
been since one had last received a full bottle. Since supplies of full 
bOttles were received at frequent intervals, there was rarely a delay of 
more than a few days for anyone who used his gas at a reasonable rate. The 
formal system of operation for the center was thus quite sinple and 
orderly. 
However, there was always a danger that the ability of the center to 
meet demand might deteriorate, requiring some people to wait even longer to 
receive their gas. Against this eventuality, people did what they could to 
make sure that they would not be among those who waited. My acquaintaoce 
was the recipient of an endless stream of small favors: neighbors and 
relatives stopped by his house to leave off a few eggs or some home-baked 
goods; urban acquaintaoces would stand him a glass of j:uic'ti whenever he 
ventured into a local bar; when shopping, he would often be waved to the 
front of the line; party offic ials stopped by his office from time to 
time personally to let him know about the inplications of a new regulation, 
and so on. He had many good, generous friends and admiring relatives, and 
*By corporate and noncorporate I mean the same thing that some writers mean 
by formal and informal. While not entirely satisfied with my choice of 
terms, formal and informal leave me uneasy because of the inplication that 
informal relations, in contrast to formal ones, lack structure, decidedly 
rot the case. Noocorpora te (informal) relations lack a char ter, constitu-
tion or table of organization. For a discussion of the patterns which non-
corporate relationships can take, see Jeremy Boissevain, 
Fr iends of Fr iends: Networks, Manipulators and Coali tions (Oxford, 
1974: Blackwell). 
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life went along smoothly as long as his supply of bOttled gas was great 
enough to fill everyone's request with a minimum of delay. Although he was 
actually distr ibuting the gas in accordarce with prescr ibed bureaucratic 
procedures, his fr iends arii relatives were content to think that he was 
giving them special treatment. 
Unfortunately, in 1974 a sudden and severe crisis in the bottled gas 
industry left my acquaintance in the untenable position of having a lot of 
people in need of gas looking for him to remind him of their special 
relationship at the same time that he had few bOttles of gas to distribute. 
He managed to weather the storm, but during the crisis he lived like a 
hunted nan. He stayed home "sick" as much as he dared, conpletely avoided 
pUblic places like bUses arii bars, and at work managed to keep bUSY in the 
m:>st rem:>te warehouses, when he could not come up with a reas:>n to be away 
from the distr ibution center altogether. 
'!he point of this story is that a knowledge of the formal organization 
of an enterprise or bureau is not necessar ily sufficient to understarii how 
it actually works. Had my acquaintance merely been performing his bureau-
cratic furction, he could have remained in the open during the crisis, 
blaming "the system" for the shar tage of gas. But since he had allowed the 
impression to develop that he was providing gas as a personal favor, his 
failure to deliver even during a general crisis was interpreted as a breach 
in social relations. If we went on to pursue this episode further, we 
would discover that the attenpts to influence the distribution center 
director were not random, but were in fact determined by pre-existing 
relationships. Ties of kith and kin, relations which are a part of the 
noncorporate organization of s:>cial relations in the county, enmeshed the 
director even before he obtained h is administrative post. But some of the 
claims also came from fellow bureaucra ts, and developed ou t of a recogni-
tion that individuals who hold formal positions within the corporate 
structure can establish personal relationships am:>ng themselves to Obtain 
favors and to facilitate the performance of office. Gifts and favors given 
in appreciation for, or in anticipation of, other favors, arii the use of 
influerce based on corporate and noncorporate relationships are an integral 
part of R:>manian society. 
The implementa tion of policy in R:>mania is always affected by the way 
in which the norcorporate structure is mobilized in relation to it. 
Marxist theory says nothing about what noncorpora te relationships should be 
like uriier socialism, beyond the expectation that they will become less 
significant through economic development. Therefore, the noncorpora te 
structure is dealt with on a tactical, ad hoc oasis. When it is used to 
circumvent or subVert the goals of the party and state, it can be severely 
repressed. At other times, national policy can be designed to placate it 
as in the reorganization of agr icultural br igades and work teams in the 
early seventies. Social relations in R:>manian villages had originally been 
ignored in determining the groupings of people into work units. When this 
proved unpopular in the villages arii, as a consequence, undermined produc-
tion, work units were restructured to take into account these noncorporate 
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relationships. This reorganization was relatively well-received and 
resulted in more enthusiastic labor and better production. The changes in 
remunerations policies for cooperative farms, increasing payments in kind 
and reducing the number of tasks recompensed in cash, were a similar 
acquiescence to "popular demand."7 
If at times the formation of policy is a compromise between the goals 
of party and those of local populations, on other occasions the party 
itself initiates the mobilization of noncorporate networks in order to 
achieve its ends. A particularly dramatic instance was the formation of 
the agricultural production collectives which took place in stages over 
more than a decade. At a crucial juncture in 1961-1963, the process was 
brought to completion, and all villages which had been passed over earlier 
were to be collectivized (except for a few in the mountains). Professor 
David Kideckel has detailed exactly how this was accomplished in one 
village, Hirseni, in County BraJov. Although the population in Hirseni was 
for the most part skeptical about the advantages of collectives and reluc-
tant to join, in the end the farm was established. While the impetus for 
the establishment of the farm certainly came "from above," its formation 
was not the result of the naked application of state power. Local and 
visiting county officials incessantly visited village households, but the 
decisive factor in formation of the collective was the mobilization of the 
noncorporate networks of kith and kin. 
Former villagers who held party and administrative posts in other 
places, and even factory workers and students, were sent home to convince 
their friends and relatives to become members of the farm. Virtually 
everyone who had both a tie to the village and a stake in a state or party 
position was mobilized in this effort at suasion. Especially intensive 
efforts were made to induce promiment village households to join the farm. 
As each household enrolled in the farm, its members were then also 
recruited to add their voices to the others. In the end, virtually every 
household became a member of the Hirseni cooperative. While the goal of 
forming the farm had come from outside of the village, the method of 
mobilizing the village behind the farm was consistent with the way in which 
a village-wide consensus had been reached on issues of importance in the 
past.S 
The development of a separation of interests between the corporate and 
noncorporate sectors presents a danger for socialist states in South-
eastern Europe. One hears people refer to the officials as "them," and 
there have been incidents, such as the protest in the Jiu valley, where a 
segment of the population has mobilized to express its dissatisfaction with 
state policy. On a more mundane level, the success or failure of local 
level officials is in large measure determined by their success or failure 
in establishing a working relationship with local networks. Certainly the 
national leadership understands that this is a problem and also that on 
occasion the interests of party and of particular communities or population 
segments may be at odds. It insists, however, that there is identity of 
interest over the long run, and that such differences are only over short-
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term goals. Since such differences could result. in overt antagonisms and 
open conflict, it is important to the leadership that they be identified 
ear ly and that appropr ia te measures be taken. Appropr ia te measures can 
include an effort to explain the policy more effectively in cases where the 
communities have a false uMerstanding, modification of the policy where 
the problem results from the failing of policy-makers, or the re-education 
or even removal of officials who have misapplied policy (the solution in 
the Jiu valley case) • In lbmania the potential ser iousness of the problem 
is indica ted by the ongoing efforts of the par ty to merge socialist and 
folk symbolism to create an identity between being lbmanian and being 
socialist. Also, the first secretary of the Cbmmunist Par ty, Nicolae 
Ceausescu, periodically takes to the airwaves, or has an item pUblished in 
~ 
the daily newspaper SCinteia, exhorting par ty and state officials to leave 
their desks and travel to their home communities to explain and promote new 
or modified policies. 
In the modern sociali st sta tes of SOutheastern Ell rope, while both 
corpora te and noncorpora te organizations exist as partially autonomous 
social processes, they are also intertwined. One cannot fully understand 
how the one works without uMerstanding the other. '!hose of us who study 
small-scale phenomena have learned that we cannot uooersta nd li fe in 
village or town without taking into account the workings of par ty, state 
aoo national economy. we have also learned that explanations of party and 
state are equally inconplete without an uMerstanding of the workings of 
noncorporate processes. This can oest be acconplished through the detailed 
field study of small-scale units.9 
Agrarian States in the Modern World 
When governments dominated by Cbnmunist parties were established in 
Southeastern Ellrope in the aftermath of WOrld War II, it ~s not surprising 
that these should be seen in the West as small-scale replicas of the SOviet 
Union. '!he existence of communist governments there seemed simple to 
explain: except in Yugoslavia aM Aloania, they had been installed oy 
RIss ian commissar s following in the wake of the Red Army. As Western 
scholars saw it, the advent of communism Drought several centuries of 
indigenous political development to an end. As Soviet "sa telli tes" these 
countr ies were presumed to have no politics or economics, out to be uooer 
the domination and direction of the Soviet Union, with everything of 
significance decided in l-bscow. In those days it was easy for a student of 
the SOViet tllion to also oecome an expert on Fastem Ellrope: one sinply 
added the phrase "aM in Eastern Ellrope as well" to any statement about the 
SOViet tllion. One measure of the progress that has been made in the study 
of Eastern Ellrope over the past two decades is that we have almost cured 
our colleagues in Soviet studies of this sort of intellectual 
imper ialism. 10 
In these twenty years we have learned that Eastern Ellrope is not merely 
a replica of the Soviet ll1ion, and also that it is itself not all of a 
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piece. Prior to the advent of communist rule, these countries had a 
variety of political and economic experiences. Poland had its long period 
of partition, with different regions governed by Prussia, Russia and 
Austria. The Czech lands, especially Bohemia, had served as an industrial 
and urban heartland of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, while Hungary had 
developed as that empire's granary. The areas which make up present-day 
Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and Yugoslavia had all been part of the Ottoman 
Empire, although each area had experienced Ottoman domination in a 
somewhat different way. Once they became independent of Ottoman rule, each 
of these Southeastern European countries developed strong political and 
economic ties with Western Europe and with Czarist Russia. After World War 
I, ties with the West became stronger than ever and throughout Eastern 
Europe, in the 1930s and 40s, German influence expanded into outright 
economic and political domination. The fall of the Third Reich marked the 
beginning of the transition to socialism. 
The varied experiences of these countries prior to the advent of 
socialism, combined with their equally varied geographical circumstances 
and natural resources, has led each to shape its own distinctive brand of 
socialism. As Western scholars have gathered ever more detailed 
information about the past and present of these countries, they have become 
increasingly cautious in making generalizations about the area as a whole. 
My decision to limit my remarks to Southeastern Europe was intended as a 
modest dramatization of this point. 
As the study of the countries of Southeastern Europe has gained its 
place in Western scholarship, three observations have shaped conventional 
understanding of the way in which modern conditions of life have developed 
there. First, they are socialist states ideologically dominated by 
Marxist-Leninist thought and under varying degrees of Soviet influence. 
Second, they are making determined efforts to become modern, developed 
countries. Third, however distinctive their histories may be, they are 
nevertheless European countries. While these observations appear to be 
self-evident, I contend that dwelling upon them has tended to inhibit a 
realistic understanding of Southeastern Europe. 11 
To begin with, there is an a priori assumption that communism is 
inherently bad or evil. A whole vocabulary of perjorative terms is applied 
to communist countries in both journalistic and scholarly writings. Words 
and phrases such as "totalitarian," "repression," "censorship," "drab," 
"police state," and "godless" are freely used, reflecting value judgments 
and springing from the writer's preference for his own political and 
economic system. As such, they are a form of ethnocentrism which can 
influence the nature of scholarship. These attitudes virtually ensure that 
no matter how "objective" a scholar intends to be, his or her conclusions 
will ultimately be cast in a negative vein. When the scholar is dealing 
with a communist country in Southeastern Europe, the problem can be 
compounded for the very terms "Byzantine" and "Balkan" have come to have 
negative connotations in the English language. 
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In evaluating the performance of these countries, one inevitably com-
pares them with the United States and with the countries of Western Europe 
because they share the same continental setting and grand cultural heritage 
and because the general theory of modernization provides the framework for 
comparative analysis. All of the versions of modernization theory have in 
common a model of developed based on the growth of urban industrial society 
in the West. To compare Southeastern Europe with the Western democracies, 
various economic, demographic and social statistics are used to serve as 
indicators of development. Inevitably, the countries of Southeastern 
Europe suffer in the comparison. They are less modern, and, whatever their 
progress, they continue to lag well behind the West. Conclusions of this 
sort reinforce preconceived assumptions about the "evils" of communism by 
demonstrating its economic and social failings. Qualitative research by 
political analysts which promotes invidious comparisons between West and 
East of qualities of freedom, human rights and political participation 
further substantiates these "evils." 
While research fitting roughly into the above mold has dominated 
Western scholarship about Southeastern Europe, there have been studies 
which take a somewhat different tack. 12 This research begins with the 
observation that the countries of Southeastern Europe have followed a path 
into the modern world fundamentally different from that of the countries of 
Northwestern Europe. In the 19th century, when the peoples of the Balkans 
were emerging from Ottoman rule, the countries of Northwestern Europe ,were 
already well established as capitalist industrial nation-states. The 
combination of national movements and international interests which 
destroyed Ottoman power in Europe also paved the way for Western influence 
in the former Ottoman lands, and in the course of the 19th century 
Southeastern Europe became firmly integrated into the Western economic 
sphere. This penetration tied agricultural production in Southeastern 
Europe to the requirements of the West, inhibited industrial development, 
and served to create and perpetuate agrarian society there. While the 
nature of these societies was rooted in their past, the form that they took 
late in the 19th century and early in the 20th century was in large measure 
a product of their attempts to meet the demands and opportunities growing 
out of their ties with the West. In the process they became countries with 
severe "peasant problems." The political parties which vied with one 
another in the period between the world wars made little progress toward 
solving this problem, and it was, if anything, intensified by Nazi German 
domination and the trauma of World War II. 
The experience of Southeastern Europe in becoming an agrarian hinter-
land of industrial Europe parallels that of other world areas. Similar 
processes creating agrarian societies geared to production for industrial 
Europe and the United States took place in much of Mediterranean Europe, 
North and West Africa, South, East and Southeast Asia, and Latin America. 
While differing radically in cultural traditions and climatic and 
geographic circumstances, these areas came to share many political, -
economic, and social forms as a result of these common experiences. 
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Since the end of World War II, economic and social development in these 
agrarian states has been approached in various ways, associated with many 
forms of political organization. When examined in the context of these 
agrarian countries, rather than compared with advanced industrial nations, 
the experiences of Southeastern Europe look rather different: their accom-
plishments appear in a much more favorable light. In general, they have 
achieved more industrialization and are sustaining a higher rate of 
economic growth;l3 their urbanization has been carried out in a far more 
balanced and controlled fashion with concomitantly fewer urban problems; 
unemployment and underemployment are insignificant; basic education is 
virtually universal and "upward mobility" through access to higher 
education is widely available; a variety of social programs promote the 
well-being of the general population. Moreover, they are more successful 
than other agrarian states in retaining the capital they generate for 
reinvestment and they suffer fewer problems resulting from the emigration 
of the most skilled and educated of their population. 14 
Conclusions 
Detailed field research conducted within the countries of Southeastern 
Europe is contributing to a more accurate and sophisticated understanding 
of their internal dynamics. Additionally, an analytic framework which 
examines this area in relationship to others with similar agrarian his-
tories is providing an alternative to conve,ntional ways of interpreting 
their problems, accomplishments, and future potential. At the very least, 
the scholarship I have been discussing represents an expansion of informa-
tion and modes of analysis available to individuals who are interested in 
Southeastern Europe. It may also have significance for the kinds of 
policies that Western states develop with respect to both the nations of 
Southeastern Europe and to agrarian nations in other parts of the world. 
The socialist states of Southeastern Europe, although differing from 
one another in the particulars of policy and practice, have made economic 
and social advances which compare very favorably with non-socialist 
agrarian states in other areas. As these states have established their own 
individual brands of socialism and have experienced some success with 
modernization, they have become increasingly independent-minded in foreign 
economic and political relations. Yugoslavia is certainly a case in point, 
as are Romania and Poland. Policies of detente toward this part of the 
world seem to be a good idea. 
Moreover, policies designed to frustrate the development of socialist 
states in other world areas are probably ill-advised. My hypothesis is 
that agrarian states which become socialist have better development 
prospects than do those that do not. 15 If even members of the Warsaw Pact 
can begin to develop independent aspects to their foreign relations, it 
seems likely that socialist states in the Third World can be expected to 
maintain a relatively unaligned stance. Encouragement and assistance from 
the West rather than opposition should make this even more likely. 
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NOTES 
1. Cyril Black discusses the genesis of the totalitarian model and how it 
came to be applied to the Soviet Union and Eastern European states in A 
Balance Sheet for East-West Exchanges, IREX Occasional Papers, Vol. l,-No. 
1). It should be noted that not all authorities who use this model 
attribute totalitarianism to communist parties. Some see it as inherent in 
Russian culture or in the cultures of the various East European states, 
with roots deep in history. 
2. An outstanding example of a volume conceived in the mold of convergence 
theory is Social Consequences of Modernization in Communist Societies, 
edited by Mark G. Field (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976). 
See especially the article in this volume by T. Anthony Jones, "Moderniza-
tion and Social Development," pp. 19-49. A general critique of convergence 
theory is to be found in Reinhard Skinner's insightful article, "Techno-
logical Determinism: A Critique of Convergence Theory," Comparative Studies 
in Soci~and History, Vol. 18, No.1 (1976), pp. 2-27. 
3. Several recent volumes which demonstrate both the potential and the 
limits of this mode of analysis are the Field volume, ~ cit.: Gail 
Lapidus, Women in Soyiet Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1978): Walter D. Connor, Socialism, Politics and Equality (New York: Colum-
bia University Press, 1979): and Trond/Gilberg, Modernization in Romania 
Since Wo~ld War II (New York: Praeger, 1975). 
4. An authoritative presentation of this perspective for Europe, both East 
and West, is S.H. Franklin, The E~ropean P~asant: The Fin~l Phase (London, 
Methuen, 1969), especially pp. 1-20 and 218-234. It also dominates text-
book social science and works in general theory. However, in the course of 
the past two decades a series of monographs on social organization in 
worker communities in the industrial West has appeared which contradicts 
the general expectation: cf. Michael Young and Peter Wilmott, Family and 
Kin in East London (Baltimore: Penguin, 1957): Mirra Komarovsky, Blue 
Collar Marriage-(New York: Random House, 1967). Michael Anderson outlines 
the dilemma of the lack of fit between general theory and specific case 
studies in his Family St~ucture in 19th-Cent~~~~q~shire (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1971). Such works as these, demonstrating the 
ongoing strength of kith and kin relations in the heart of the industrial 
West make it difficult to accept the premise that such relations will 
wither away with modernization in Eastern Europe. 
5. Cf. M. Cernea, "The Large-Scale Formal Organization and the Family 
Group," Journal of Marriage and the Family, Vol. 37, No.4 (1975), pp. 927-
936. 
6. This conclusion is consistent with the findings of research in other 
parts of Southeastern Europe. The literature in English is richest for 
Yugoslavia, where research by American and British scholars has been 
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ongoing since the mid-1950s. Among the many works which touch on the role 
of kith and kin in the process of social change are: Joel M. Halpern, A 
Se~bian Village: Social and Cultural Change in a Y~~slav Community (New 
York: Harper & ROw, 1967); E.A. Hammel, "Social Mobility, Economic 
Change and Kinship in Serbia," Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, Vol. 
25 (1969), pp. 188-197; William Lockwood, European Moslems: Economy and 
Ethnicity in Western Bosnia (New York: Academic Press, 1976); Ba~~~nistica, 
Volume III, Peasant Culture and N~tional Culture in Southeastern Europ~ 
(Ann Arbor: Slavica Publishers, 1976). An indispensable aid to the study 
of social relations in Southeastern Europe is Irwin Sanders, Roger 
Whitaker, and Walter C. Bisselle, eds., East European Peasantries: Social 
Relations. An Annotated Bibliography of Periodical Articles (Boston: 
G.K. Hall, 1976). 
7. David Kideckel, "The Dialectic of Rural Development: Cooperative Farm 
Goals and Family Strategies in a Romanian Commune," Journal of Rural 
Cooperatio~, Vol. V, No.1 (1977), pp. 43-62. 
8. David Kideckel, Agricultural Cooperativism in a Ro~~~~an Commune, Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Massachusetts, 1979, pp. 90-94. 
9. This is, of course, hardly unique to the study of Southeastern European 
societies. Two works which examine this as a general method are Abner 
Cohen, Two Dim~nsional Man: An E~say on t~e Anthropology of Power anq 
~lism in Complex Socie~ (London: Routledge & Kegan paul, 1974), and 
L.A. Fallers, ~he Social Anthropology of the Nation State (Chicago: 
Aldine, 1974). 
10. However, the ongoing imperious attitude of our more numerous Soviet 
and Russian studies colleagues is indicated by the fact that those of us 
who study Albanians, Estonians, Finns, Gypsies, (East) Germans, Hungarians, 
Lapps, Lithuanians, Latvians, and Romanians are expected to join a pro-
fessional association called the American Association for the Advancement 
of Slavic Studies. Dissatisfaction with this state of affairs is no doubt 
responsible for the recent formation of the American Association for South-
east European Studies. 
11. The problem of regarding Europe as all of one piece and of applying 
modernization/development models derived from the experiences of North-
western Europe to other parts of the continent are discussed in John W. 
Cole, "Anthropology Comes part-Way Home: Community Studies in Europe," 
Annual Re~~ew of Anthropology, Vol. 6, pp. 349-378 (Palo Alto, 1977: Annual 
Reviews, Inc.). 
12. One approach is the "world systems" viewpoint developed by Immanuel 
Wallerstein in The Modern World Syste~: Capitalist A~riculture a~d th~ 
Origins qf the European World-Economy in the S~~teenth Century (New York: 
Acade~ic Press, 1974) and in numerous articles. It also dominates the 
articles published in Review, a journal edited by Wallerstein. Daniel 
Chirot's volume, Social Change in a Perip~eral Society: The Creation 
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of a Balkan Colony (New York: Academic Press, 1976) is cast in the same 
mold. The development of ties of dependency between East-Central Europe 
and Northwestern Europe is traced with insight and intellectual rigor by 
Ivan T. Berend and Gyorgy Ranki in Economic Development in East-Central 
Europe in the 19th and 20th Cen~uries (New York: Columbia University, 
Press, 1974). Ethnic~ty and Nationalism in ~~~~heastern Europe, Sam Beck 
and John W. Cole, eds., is largely devoted to an examination of the 
relationship between ethnicity, nationalism, and economic dependency in 
Southeastern Europe. For Romania, see Kenneth Jowitt, ed., Social Change 
in Romani~, 1860-1940: A D~~ate on Development in a European Nation 
(University of California, Institute of International Studies, Research 
Series No. 37, 1978). 
13. John W. Meyer, John Boli-Bennett, and Christopher Chase-Dunn, "Con-
vergence and Divergence in Development," Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 
1, pp. 223-246 (Palo Alto: Annual Reviews, Inc., 1975). 
14. It would take a second essay, longer and more involved than this one, 
to examine the assumptions made by Western scholars (Marxist and positivist 
alike) that the human costs of Eastern European achievements are excessive. 
Western comments on the human condition in Eastern Europe are made against 
either idealized versions of "freedom" in the industrialized West, or an 
abstract concept of human rights. They rarely take into account the 
specific problems faced by small nations attempting to modernize. 
Condemnation of East European states for severely restricting emigrants and 
foreign travel ignore the implications of open borders for small countries. 
In the European context, open borders in small modernizing states have 
meant a "brain drain" and an ongoing export of labor to industrial North-
western Europe. Case studies, such as that by Jane and Peter Schneider on 
Sicily, Culture and Political Economy in Western Sicily (New York, 1976i 
Academic Press) and surveys such as S. Castles and G. Rosack, Immigrant 
Workers and Class Structure in Western E~ (London, 1973: Oxford 
University Press) suggest that the human costs of open borders may be at 
least as severe as closed ones. 
15. One of the few attempts to assess the quality of the human condition 
in societies which have undergone revolution and those which have not is 
Susan Ekstein, The Impact of Revolution on Social Welfare in Latin America 
(Theory and Society 11(1):43-94, 1982). 
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